Position Paper On Second Wave of Covid-19 Pandemic in India

click here to read All India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN) Position Paper (English)

click here to read Hindi version of Position Paper 

On Second Wave of Covid-19 Pandemic in India

14 Apr 2021

click here to read the short statement (English) based on the position paper

click here to read the short statement (Hindi) based on the position paper 

Click here to read short statement in Odia

India is well and truly into a brutal second wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. Daily cases are skyrocketing to unprecedented heights, and are now the highest of all countries, while total cases have taken India to second place worldwide overtaking badly hit Brazil. For the sixth day, India had record numbers of daily cases over 1 lakh, reaching 1, 61,736 new cases on 13 April, far higher than the  record high of 97,894 new daily cases on 16 September 2020 during the first wave.  Going by current trends, India is likely to reach even higher daily case rates, with these new highs prevailing for a prolonged period, unless strong and effective steps are urgently taken. Mortality and hospitalization rates are on the rise dangerously in parts of the country and show a worrying trend overall.

Accept responsibility; don’t blame the people and States

A very belated high-level meeting at the PMO a week ago “emphasized that the reasons for the sharper rise in cases could be mainly attributed to the severe decline in compliance of Covid-appropriate behavior primarily in terms of use of masks and maintaining ‘2 Gaj ki Doori’ [two yards distance], pandemic fatigue and lack of effective implementation of containment measures at the field level.” This analysis blaming the people and the States for this crisis, and repetition of the same charge by other high officials, is disingenuous, hypocritical and even dangerous, serving only to enable the Centre to evade responsibility for the present situation and give itself an excuse for future inaction or failure. It is evident even to a casual observer that broad sections of the people all over the country have become extremely lax as regards masking, maintaining physical distancing and avoiding crowded spaces especially indoors. However, this begs the question: what was the Government doing to tackle this and prevent the inevitable consequences of a second wave, and did not the Government itself encourage this laxity?

As public health experts have pointed out, the period when cases were sharply declining reaching a trough or low point of 9,121 on 15 February, provided the best opportunity to attack the virus through vigorous containment and mitigation actions including expanded vaccinations, but the Government lowered its guard and missed this chance. Meanwhile, encouraged by signals  from the Centre, authorities everywhere relaxed all restrictions, with offices, cinemas, restaurants, malls, passenger airlines and public transport all functioning at full capacity virtually in a pre-pandemic “life as usual” mode. Learning from the first wave, it is important that measures are taken through a partnership between the Centre and States, with the Centre providing evidence-based guidelines and financial as well as other assistance, with the Centre not making efforts to shift blame to States while withholding essential supplies and co-operation on many fronts.

Experience of different countries has repeatedly underlined the importance of continued vigilance and ensuring Covid-appropriate behavior during periods of declining cases. However, the Government itself suggested, through its National Covid Supermodel, that cases in India had peaked by October 2020 and would be under control by February 2021, and led to widespread lowering of guard. Even today, in the midst of this dangerous second wave, huge crowds are attending potentially super-spreader events such as the massive gatherings at the Mahakumbh Mela, and packed rallies and road shows during the State elections frequently addressed by the topmost Government leaders who are themselves responsible for Covid-19 control measures. No guidelines have been issued, no efforts at enforcement of Covid norms are being made, and the few mild public appeals seem like a mere a formality. It would appear there is no pandemic in India!

Additional epidemiological data and further analysis is required to arrive at any firm conclusions as to reasons behind this second wave, and precautions required to be taken in the future.

Understand role of variants, expand gene sequencing

There is considerable discussion, albeit so far without adequate evidence or data, about one particular reason that may be contributing to this second wave, namely Sars Cov2 virus variants which may be more infectious, or deadlier, or even provide a “vaccine escape” i.e. being resistant to vaccine-induced immunity. It is well known that viruses mutate to combat increasing immunity in the host population due either to widespread prior infections or vaccination. The major internationally known variant strains or lineages are the so-called UK variant (B.1.1.7), which ravaged Britain and has now emerged as a dominant strain in the US and may even lead to more deaths, the South African variant (B.1.351) and the Brazilian variant (P.1.). All these variants have been observed in India. Of around 10,787 samples from 18 Indian states analyzed by labs involved with the Indian SARS-CoV-2 Consortium on Genomics (INSACOG), 771 variant cases were detected comprising 736 UK (336 in Punjab alone), 34 South African and 1 Brazilian variant. Maharashtra has shown a worryingly large number of cases (202 of the above sample) with a “double mutation” (E484Q and L452R), now assigned a distinct lineage B.1.617.

However, insufficient information is available as of now to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of these variants. Also, not enough is known about the efficacy of different vaccines in protecting against these variants, although some available information suggests that the Oxford-AstraZeneca or Covishield vaccine provides good protection from the UK variant but not from the South African variant. INSACOG has been beset with difficulties and only 7,664 samples – less than 1% of the total positive samples since January 2021 through March 18, 2021 – have been sequenced. It is important that India significantly expands genetic testing across the country and correlates findings with epidemiological data in order to obtain a better understanding of the dangers posed by these variants. There is therefore need for more laboratory and field studies regarding the efficacy of Covishield, Covaxin and other vaccines likely to be used with respect to these variants.

Increase testing, tracing and surveillance

It is important to note that the main public health response to the present second wave, irrespective of these variants and other factors, remains broadly the same as was advocated earlier, but learning from missteps and experience during the first wave.  India needs to vigorously test, trace, isolate and treat infected persons, besides putting in place decentralized, locally relevant and evidence-based surveillance and containment strategies. Test positivity rate in the first wave was highest at around 12.7% on 20 July 2020, about 8.7% at the case load peak around 20 September 2020 and was at its lowest at 1.6% on 15 February 2021. Today all-India average test positivity rate is high at 11.4% on 12 April 2021 showing inadequate testing, and rising continuously. Testing needs to be ramped up significantly, with emphasis on RT-PCR tests, so as to uncover infections more quickly. At the same time, testing needs to be strategic, targeting contacts of positive cases and symptomatic cases in clusters identified through community surveillance and contact tracing.

Contact tracing was the weakest aspect of the response by governments at the Centre and most States during the first wave, with the Aarogya Setu App proving to be ineffective, and badly needs to be strengthened now. Tracing all contacts quickly, testing and then isolating them if infected, is essential for quick containment of the spread of the disease, along with community-level surveillance measures to identify potential hot spots. Decentralized evidence-based approaches with community participation would be most effective. All available human resources need to be mobilized for this, going beyond health workers and the police who may have enough on their hands, and tapping NDRF, home guards, educated youth and other volunteers, and civil society organizations, all with proper training for the purpose. Data relating to contacts traced, tested and isolated should also be included in daily reporting dashboards of State governments along with cases, tests, deaths etc, since this would act as a monitoring mechanism as well as motivation to perform better.

Address Vaccine shortage & Equity

There is a seriously mistaken tendency among authorities, and also some commentators, to look to vaccines as a silver bullet to tackle the pandemic and bring this second wave to an end. India is currently vaccinating an average of 3-4 million persons per day and has so far administered around 85 million doses. While this may look good in absolute numbers, especially for a developing country, India’s vaccinations per capita rank well below the global average. Many States are also complaining of shortages in vaccine supply from the Centre.

It also needs to be emphasized that India will take at least another 55 days at present rates to administer at least one dose to the original target of 300 million persons for this phase, not counting the additional recipients due to inclusion of all above the age of 45 years in the eligible group. That still leaves a huge gap of several hundreds of millions of doses requiring to be administered even if those under 18 years are not counted. Clearly, India cannot just wait for vaccinations to be completed and must press on urgently and effectively now with the public health measures discussed above.

There is much information available, albeit scattered and mostly anecdotal at present that a class divide is emerging in India’s vaccination drive, in cities as well as in many rural areas in the country. Those missing out on vaccinations say they do not know where vaccines are being administered, how to get vaccinated, how to enroll for vaccinations, that they do not have smart phones etc. These deficiencies need to be urgently rectified by suitable modifications in the vaccination strategy, especially by taking the vaccines to eligible populations at community level and conducting widespread communication campaigns on the vaccination drive. Continuing vaccine hesitancy also needs to be overcome.

The weakness in vaccinating health workers and frontline workers, the first in the eligibility queue, also needs to be overcome urgently. Reports suggest that around one-third of health workers have not been vaccinated, for whatever reason. Having noticed some misuse of the priority facility for health workers, the Government has recently closed the enrollment of health workers for vaccination. Instead of taking punitive action against health workers by closing their enrollment for vaccination, Government should rectify the enrollment system and block loopholes, while actively persuading health workers to get vaccinated.

Scale-up Vaccine production and availability

These vaccine numbers show that, quite apart from complaints by several States about vaccine shortages and lack of timely supplies from the Centre, requirement for vaccines is currently greater than supply and likely to remain so over the next few months. According to reports, Serum Institute of India (SII) is producing around 21.6 lakh doses of Covishield daily or 648 lakh (64.8 million) doses per month. Bharat Biotech is manufacturing around 1.6 lakh doses of Covaxin daily (4.8 million doses per month). The total production is therefore enough only for 23 lakh doses daily, much below even current vaccination rates, leave alone an expanded vaccination drive. Therefore the Government needs to urgently take steps to boost manufacturing capacity. For instance, both the above manufacturers have requested the Government to finance expansion of production significantly and quickly. SII has said it could ramp up production of Covishield to 200 million doses per month if such financing is made available, and. Bharat Biotech says they could scale up production of Covaxin to around 7 times current levels or to about 33.6 million doses per month.

All those who are clamoring for on-demand vaccinations for the entire adult population should keep these supply chain constraints in mind. At the same time, the suggestion from several hospitals and doctors that those between 18 and 45 with serious co-morbidities should also be brought within the eligibility criteria for vaccinations need consideration.

At the same time, the Government should also take several other steps to ramp up availability of vaccines. At the time of writing, the Russian Sputnik-V vaccine, which has a proven high efficacy against the SARS Cov2 virus and has also undergone bridging trials in India, has been given emergency use approval by DCGI after a prolonged wait while being repeatedly asked for additional data. This contrasts sharply with the rapid pace with which Bharat Biotech’s Covaxin was approved, without even waiting for efficacy data. This is not to argue for similarly cutting of corners for Sputnik-V or other vaccines, but Government should help to expedite the process. Sputnik-V is not prohibitively expensive, unlike the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines, and can be stored in ordinary refrigerators in powder form, and can therefore form an important part of India’s vaccination programme. Russia Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) has also tied up with 6 Indian vaccine manufacturing companies to together produce around 650 million doses. However, since this production in India will take time, Sputnik V will initially be fully imported from Russia. Again, at the time of writing, Government has decided to invite those vaccines approved by WHO and by regulators in the US, Europe and Japan to apply for approval in India without having to undergo bridging trials, stating that close watch would initially be kept on safety aspects before large-scale roll out.

Care should be taken to ensure that modalities of import, pricing and distribution are designed in such a manner as to not accentuate the present class divide in vaccine access, and that a dual-access does not emerge where the well-off have ready access to a wide variety of vaccines through private facilities by virtue of their ability to pay higher prices, while the poor struggle to access vaccines due to lack of paying ability and poor access to information.

Address Licensing/ IP issues

It is unfortunate that despite this good track record of assisting the global vaccination effort despite high , India has not pushed back on high-income countries such as in the US and in EU countries who have hoarded vaccines at the cost of other especially poorer countries.

India recently participated in a Meeting of the Indo-Pacific Quad grouping comprising the US, Australia, Japan and India. Among other things, the Meeting discussed a major Quad role in enhancing vaccine supplies for the Indo-Pacific region through an agreement under which the US would provide vaccine know-how and share financing with Japan, India would take responsibility for manufacture and Australia would handle logistics for supply of 1000 million doses to the region by end of 2022. Unfortunately, India did not use the occasion to raise the issue forcefully with the US, merely stating afterwards that the matter is sensitive and is being discussed with the US bilaterally. India must push the US strenuously in this regard; otherwise the “strategic partnership” would mean little.

India and South Africa also moved a proposal to the WTO in October 2020 calling for suspension of intellectual property rules and other obstructions to sharing of know-how especially to developing countries to enable the latter to manufacture vaccines, medicines and other medical products and hence to more rapidly bring the Covid-19 pandemic under control at least cost to their people. Regrettably, but true to form of the global North, the high-income countries notably the US, UK and EU blocked the proposal. In this case too, India did not actively pursue this proposal, which had the backing of the developing countries, either bilaterally with the US and other developed countries or in multi-lateral fora, revealing a possible lack of courage and determination to take on the leaders of global capitalism.

However, this demand by India points to another measure the Government could take in India so as to ramp up production of vaccines in India. The Covaxin vaccine was developed by the National Institute of Virology in Pune, a laboratory under the Indian Council of Medical Research, and productionized by the Hyderabad-based Bharat Biotech who put it into production.  It is suggested that the Government take the initiative to work out arrangements for licensing other Indian manufacturers to produce Covaxin so as to augment total supply of this vaccine. Established public sector enterprises such as the Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceutical Corporation Limited, Maharashtra should also be included in this endeavor, putting aside the blind ideological opposition of the ruling dispensation to PSUs.

There is no compulsion to allow Bharat Biotech to retain a monopoly over the know-how for this vaccine, especially during this dangerous second wave of the pandemic, just as India had joined South Africa to demand that vaccine developers and manufacturers in the developed countries give up their monopoly rights.

Oppose misguided vaccine nationalism

In this connection, there is a wholly misconceived campaign being mounted, including by some political parties and sections of the media, that India should stop commercial and aid-based exports of vaccines so as to prioritize domestic needs. Even before this, the Government had imposed some restrictions on exports potentially undoing the goodwill earned earlier by free supply of vaccine to friendly developing countries and by its substantial contribution to the international Covax facility to supply vaccines to lower income countries. India has exported around 64.5 million vaccine doses, mostly of Covishield, since January 2021. Of this, 10.5 million were free supplies to developing countries and UN peace-keeping forces, 18.2 million to Covax, and 35.8 million were commercial exports, again including under contractual agreements with AstraZeneca which has licensed the manufacture of Covishield in India. Notably, India has hugely benefited from the transfer of technology from Oxford AstraZeneca to SII of a vaccine whose price has been deliberately kept low so as to benefit other developing countries. Supplies to Covax too are contracted and manufacturers like SII have received substantial advance funding under the Covax programme, so these actually should not be stopped or delayed, although reports are that India has slowed down supplies to Covax and also under its aid programme, causing anxiety among these recipients.

It should also be noted that India has received back around one-third of its supplies to Covax, since India too is a beneficiary country, and largest recipient, under Covax! The free vaccine supplies amounts to just 3 days of vaccination in India at present rates, and even the commercial exports are equivalent to only about 10 days’ supply for vaccination in India. Therefore, stopping exports will not provide much relief from the demand-supply gap India is facing. Further, China and India are almost the only countries that are working to assist the global vaccination effort especially in developing and low-income countries, and it would be cruel and immoral to weaken or close down this endeavor in an extremely selfish display of vaccine nationalism, and that too for very little benefit. This is a record to be proud of not condemned. The point again is that what India needs to do now is to ramp up vaccine production by existing manufacturers, and by quickly approving the production and deployment of several other vaccines that are in the pipeline.

It is precisely this kind of vaccine nationalism and related crass commercialism practiced by the US which is one of the major factors preventing SII, Biological-E (licensed to manufacture the Johnson & Johnson vaccine in India) and other vaccine manufacturers in India to scale up production. These manufacturers depend on various raw materials and intermediates such as specialized bags, filters, cell culture media, single-use tubing and special chemicals from the US, which has imposed an export ban on all vaccine-related materials under its Defence Production Act. If India were to similarly restrict exports, it would have no moral authority to demand opening up of exports by the US or others.

 

For clarifications contact:

D.Raghunandan 9810098621; T. Sundararaman 9987438253; S. Krishnaswamy 9442158638

P.Rajamanickam, General Secretary, AIPSN gsaipsn@gmail.com, 9442915101 @gsaipsn

 

On Covaxin Interim Results from Phase 3 trials  

click here to read the English pdf of AIPSNStatement-on-CovaxinPhase3InterimResults-7Mar

On Covaxin Interim Results from Phase 3 trials

7 Mar 2021

All India Peoples Science Network welcomes the first interim efficacy data from Phase-3 clinical trials as released by M/S Bharat Biotech for the indigenously developed Covid-19 vaccine “Covaxin”. Based on the initial 43 cases of Covid-19 of which 39 were in the placebo arm and 7 were in the vaccinated arm of the phase 3 trial involving 25800 participants with 1:1 random allocation of vaccine and placebo, Bharat Biotech announced a point estimate of vaccine efficacy of 80.56% with two doses four weeks apart. The trial also showed protection from infection and severe disease across different segments of the population. Bharat Biotech has planned to release a second interim analysis at 87 cases, and a final analysis when 130 cases are reached in the near future. AIPSN looks forward to peer review and publication of all the data at the earliest.

Peer reviewed Phase-3 trial data should be submitted by Bharat Biotech to the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) at the earliest so that the regulator may issue revised emergency use approval for Covaxin, doing away with the various conditions attached to it, notably the requirement of administering the vaccine in clinical trial, which were considered necessary by DCGI and its Subject Expert Committee because of the absence of Phase-3 trial data at that time. These steps would overcome the objections of a large section of the scientific community and civil society in India, who had raised their voice against premature approval to Covaxin without Phase-3 trial data.

Once approval is granted by DCGI to Covaxin on par with Covishield, Covaxin can justifiably join the global set of approved vaccines against the Covid-19 disease, enabling it to cater to the huge international demand for vaccines especially among developing countries. An indigenous Covid-19 vaccine, developed by the National Institute of Virology (NIV) under the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), and manufactured by Bharat Biotech, legitimately gaining such acceptance internationally, would indeed be a matter of pride for Indian science and industry.

Statements by Government spokespersons claiming vindication of their support for the premature approval for Covaxin and its inclusion in the vaccination rollout, are entirely misplaced. As anticipated by those who strongly opposed both moves, including the AIPSN, the premature approval for Covaxin without Phase-3 data, clearly under Government pressure, has avoidably caused immense embarrassment at home and abroad, damaged the reputation of Indian science and regulatory institutions, and added to vaccine hesitancy in India. Little would have been lost if DCGI had waited for Phase-3 data now available. According to publicly available data, only about 10% of the approximately 16 million vaccination doses administered so far have been of Covaxin, a gap that could have easily been made up with Covishield.

AIPSN hopes that the nearly 81% efficacy shown by the first interim analysis of Covaxin phase 3 trials will now help dispel the earlier vaccine hesitancy due to hasty approval without data. AIPSN appeals to all eligible people to get vaccinated in order to protect themselves and prevent others who cannot be vaccinated from getting Covid-19. It is hoped that Bharat Biotech will now ramp up production to required levels and join the international battle against Covid-19 with full confidence. It is time the Government realizes that promotion of true self-reliance is not well-served by artificial support or false claims, but by promotion of quality R&D and products that can match the best in the world and compete globally on its own merits.

 

 

For clarifications contact:

D. Raghunandan 9810098621 S.Krishnaswamy 9442158638

P. Rajamanickam, General Secretary, AIPSN gsaipsn@gmail.com, 9442915101 @gsaipsn

 

Statement on Vaccines Roll-out

Statement on Vaccines Roll-out

click here to read the English pdf of the AIPSN-Statement-Vaccine-Rollout-15Jan2021

Click here to read Hindi pdf of AIPSN-Statement-Vaccine-Rollout-15Jan2021

AIPSN Statement on Vaccines Roll-out

15 Jan 2021

 

All India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN) is shocked that, as part of the mass vaccinations in India beginning on 16 January 2021 with inoculation of health workers, the Central Government is distributing 56 lakh doses of Bharat Biotech-ICMR’s Covaxin, along with 110 lakh doses of Serum Institute of India-Oxford Astra Zeneca’s Covishield. This is in open defiance of the conditions imposed by the Central Drugs Standards Control Organization (CDSCO) while granting emergency approval for Covaxin. CDSCO and its Subject Expert Committee (SEC) had clearly differentiated between Covishield and Covaxin. Whereas both vaccines were approved for “restricted use in emergency situations,” Covaxin was given conditional approval, after apparent overnight arm-twisting of the SEC, only in clinical trial mode (emphasis added).”

56 lakh doses, i.e. inoculation of 28 lakh persons, cannot be considered a “trial” by any stretch of the imagination, especially when Phase-3 clinical trials for Covaxin are already underway involving around 26,000 volunteers. Clearly, the Government has placed Covaxin and Covishield on similar footing, other than total numbers as of now. Any “trial mode” vaccination should involve special monitoring, follow-up and institutional arrangements. The ethical and scientific quality of the ‘trials’ cannot be disregarded. There is no information yet available in the public domain if the Government has communicated any special protocols for Covaxin inoculation. Most importantly, clinical trials should require informed consent or refusal by Covaxin recipients, after being made fully aware of conditions imposed by the CDSCO and the absence of Phase-III efficacy data.

In contrast, Secretary, Union Health Ministry stated in a press conference that recipients would have no right to choose between the two vaccines, making it clear that the Central Government is intent on shoving Covaxin down the throats of State Governments and into the arms of innocent recipients, in this first round the health workers and “Covid heroes” regardless of the CDSCO conditions.

Government has only itself to blame if public suspicion about Covaxin and vaccine skepticism increases further due to its own complete opacity in rolling out  Covaxin, with no information on any of the questions raised here. Unfortunately, the CDSCO and the Union Health Ministry, have subverted the scientific criteria regarding the regulation of vaccines including their own guidelines for emergency use. This would compromise both people’s interests and the credibility of Indian pharma internationally. Bharat Biotech CEO’s unseemly attack on people who have criticized the government’s clearance on emergency use of its vaccine and attacking other vaccines does not add any credibility to its vaccine.

 

AIPSN  urges: 

  • The Union Government issue special protocols for Covaxin administration in “clinical trial mode,” including obtaining informed consent or refusal of recipients and ensuring compliance with all CDSCO/SEC approval conditions; 
  • CDSCO and ICMR to ensure that all clinical trials conform to necessary ethical, scientific and technical standards; 
  • All State Governments take a hard decision on whether to deploy Covaxin widely, or whether to strictly conform to CDSCO/SEC conditions of limited “trial mode” deployment; 

 

 

For clarifications contact:

T.Sundararaman 99874388253 D. Raghunandan 9810098621 S. Krishnaswamy 9442158638

 

On Hasty Regulatory Approvals in India for Covid-19 Vaccines

click here for pdf of English version AIPSNStatement-VaccineApprovals-6Jan2021

On Hasty Regulatory Approvals in India for Covid-19 Vaccines

6 Jan 2021

India’s regulatory authority for medical products, the Central Drug Standards Control Organization (CDSCO), gave  “restricted emergency approval” on 2nd January 2020 for two Covid-19 Vaccines, namely Serum Institute of India (SII)’s “Covishield” being manufactured in India under technology transfer from Oxford University-Astra Zeneca, and the indigenous “Covaxin” developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with ICMR/National Institute of Virology.

AIPSN salutes the efforts of Indian scientists, research institutions and vaccine manufacturers in bringing to the forefront indigenous vaccines like Covaxin in less than a year, with some other candidates just a few months behind. As and when these vaccines meet the threshold requirements for at least 50% efficacy, AIPSN will join other citizens in hailing this triumph and India’s contribution to the global battle against the Covid-19 pandemic.

Tragically, the Government and CDSCO have together seriously damaged these hopes, and also undermined confidence in Covaxin and other vaccines against Covid-19, in particular concerning Covaxin, due to lack of evidence and unsatisfactory scientific basis, non-transparency and concerns around possible political pressure.

SII’s Covishield was approved on the basis of Phase-III clinical trials data from Brazil and the UK, and the approval granted by the UK’s Medical & Healthcare Regulatory Agency (MHRA) based on 70.4% efficacy revealed by the related published data despite some remaining grey areas relating to varying dosages. CDSCO approval for SII’s Covishield could have awaited results from on-going Phase-III trials and bridge studies in India to demonstrate efficacy and bio-equivalence.  However, given the UK approval the approval by CDSCO, although not ideal, may be understandable. Questions still remain, however, about the Health Ministry’s announcement of an extended gap of up to 12 weeks between the first and second doses, whereas the SEC is understood to have recommended the original protocol of 28-days.

The approval for Bharat Biotech’s Covaxin raises more serious questions. The SEC had called for additional data from Phase-III trials, but appears to have been pressured overnight into reconsidering its decision and giving approval the next day, albeit hedged in by many conditions. CDSCO’s Statement shows that the approval is based only on Phase-I and Phase-II data on safety and immune response, but without any efficacy data from Phase-III trials. Top-ranking officials of the Government and ICMR have been strenuously defending this decision by stressing safety and arguing, without any evidence, that the design of Covaxin might make it more effective against the new UK mutation.  The opinion of ICMR, a co-developer of Covaxin, reflects possible bias and a conflict of interest, besides adding to perceptions of pressure on the regulator.

The serious doubts of the SEC on Covaxin are reflected in the CDSCO’s statement saying SII’s Covishield is approved “for restricted use in emergency situation subject to certain regulatory conditions” whereas, in contrast, approval for Bharat Biotech-ICMR’s Covaxin is given with numerous conditions such as “restricted use in emergency situation in public interest as an abundant precaution, in clinical trial mode, to have more options for vaccinations, especially in case of infection by mutant strains (emphasis added).”

True to form, the Government is steamrolling the decision, and attacking all critics, including many leading Indian scientists, as opponents of Indian science who should instead be upholding “national pride” over the indigenously developed vaccine. This achievement will indeed be hailed as a major Indian scientific achievement once efficacy data are released but, by this hasty approval without evidence, the Government has shot itself in the foot. Whatever prestige India may gain abroad for an indigenously-developed vaccine will be outweighed by the damage caused to the credibility of Covaxin in particular, and of Indian science, research and regulatory institutions.

 

In light of the above, the AIPSN calls for:

  1. Re-consideration of approval for Covaxin till efficacy data is available or, at least, strict adherence to conditions specified in the CDSCO order implying no roll-out of Covaxin for mass vaccination. 
  2. Phase-III efficacy trials for both vaccines continue without extraneous pressure and the data published at the earliest
  3. No vaccine or Covid-19 related drug be released for commercial use in the private sector until regular approval as per protocols (as distinct from emergency use authorization) are obtained.

For clarifications contact:

Sundararaman 99874388253 D. Raghunandan 9810098621 S.Krishnaswamy 9442158638

Rajamanickam, General Secretary, AIPSN gsaipsn@gmail.com, 9442915101 @gsaipsn

 

AIPSN statement on Vaccines and IPR waiver: India-South Africa Proposal for TRIPS Waiver – Putting People before Profit

click here for pdf of AIPSN-statement-on-Vaccines-and-IPR

AIPSN statement on Vaccines and IPR waiver

India-South Africa Proposal for TRIPS Waiver – Putting People before Profit

As Covid-19 pandemic continues to keep its grip on the globe, countries are facing severe shortages in medical supplies and treatments, with intellectual property rights hindering the timely provisioning of affordable medical products. To address this, India and South Africa have put in a proposal at the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), demanding a temporary waiver of certain TRIPS obligations on copyrights and related rights, industrial designs, patents, and the protection of undisclosed information in relation to the prevention, containment or treatment of Covid-19.

Most of the least developed and developing countries have supported these proposal in the TRIPS council, arguing for equitable and affordable access to medicines and medical products at least in these times of widespread catastrophe. The proposal has also got support from the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, it has been opposed by developed countries such as the US, the UK, Japan and even Brazil, on the grounds that such a move would hinder innovation and that there is no indication of intellectual property rights (IPRs) being a barrier to accessing Covid-19 related medicines and technologies.

Nothing can be farther from the truth! Over the last few months, countries have faced IP barriers in drugs, masks, ventilator valves and reagents for testing kits. Multiple patents have been filed for Covid-19 vaccines in development(https://msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/COVID_Brief_ProposalWTOWaiver_ENG_2020.pdf ). Even the stockpiles of potential vaccines have been reportedly cornered by the rich countries.

 Unequal Access to Medical Products across Countries even in times of Global Crisis

More than nine months into the pandemic, the situation across the globe remains grim not only in terms of the spread and impact of the pandemic but also the availability of medical products. On the one hand global supply chains have broken down leading to supply shortages, on the other the demand has been increasing due to rising incidence of coronavirus. The Low and Middle Income Countries (LMICs) are the worst hit because the Covid-19 pandemic has not just been a public health crisis, it has been economically devastating as well. The national budgets of these countries are severely strained and most of them also lack the production capacity of the much needed medical products. It is unfortunate that in such dire times when the world is waiting for a vaccine we are witnessing (https://twn.my/title2/briefing_papers/twn/Inovio%20countersued%20IP-COVID%20Jul%202020%20Hammond.pdf) manufacturers relying on proprietary production techniques thereby potentially making vaccines more expensive and less available, large commitments of manufacturing capacity in 2021/2022 being sealed up in contracts, and rich countries locking down COVID-19 vaccine supplies through big money contracts(https://launchandscalefaster.org/covid-19).

Appropriating Public Funds for Private Profits

Public funding must cater to people’s needs rather than corporate greed. Ironically, out of the total funding of 96 million USD for research into Coronaviral diseases (including MERS, SARS) during 2016-18, the bulk 93% has been public funding, 6% by philanthropic organisations and less than 1% by the industry. If we look at the larger set of Emerging Infectious diseases, the proportion of public funding is 77% and that of industry 18% during 2014-18 (https://gfinderdata.policycuresresearch.org/) Even for the Covid-19 pandemic, it is largely public funds that have been committed by various governments. The big pharma, thus, uses public funds for R&D to garner private profits, taking advantage of the IPR regime without any concrete commitment to share the technologies and know how developed through public funding to scale up the production through non-originator manufactures.

Multilateral Trade Policy – Creating Monopoly Profits

Just as the TRIPS agreement was bulldozed on to the least developed and developing countries during the 1990s in the name of ‘free and fair’ trade regime, so are the developed countries arguing to protect the IPRs, which are in fact means for creation of monopoly profits. The big corporations and the rich countries were as hand in glove then as they are today. The trade policy regime has led to concentration of manufacture products in a few countries. As per a WTO report (https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/rese_03apr20_e.pdf), Germany, the United States (US), and Switzerland supply 35% of world’s medical products; China, Germany and the US export 40% of personal protective products. Such concentration of production in times of huge global demand is bound to lead to profiteering and to deal with this is to decentralise production through local manufacturing. To do this, access to the whole range of technologies and strategies for manufacturing these products is required.

TRIPS flexibilities are insufficient

TRIPS flexibilities were included in the Doha Development Agenda in order to safeguard LMICs from the adverse impact of patent regime. However, it has been effective only on a few occasions because of arm-twisting tactics of the big pharma, operating in cahoots with the rich country governments through bilateral pressures on countries as also lobbying by the big pharma against generic drugs. Also, the rules for compulsory licensing apply only on a case-by-case and product-by-product basis, which slows down the ability of countries to scale up production. Even Article 31bis, a mechanism to supply countries with insufficient manufacturing capacity, is limited in its application. TRIPS obligations, furthering the IPR regime, would only exacerbate the crisis.

Global Solidarity – A Farce!

The WHO has got little support by pharma industry for its Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) initiative (https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/global-research-on-novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov/covid-19-technology-access-pool), aiming at voluntary contribution of IP, technologies and data to support global sharing and scale up of manufacturing and supply of COVID-19 health technologies. Voluntary cooperative approaches such as the COVAX are only a short term solution and only work towards maintaining the current business models of big pharma. The GAVI-CEPI initiative has refused to address the issue of patents and other intellectual property rights even on the issue of Covid-19 preferring to work with global pharma MNC’s on vaccine development and pooling philanthropic resources for the poorer countries. Such philanthro-capitalist measures only deepen the structural inequalities in global health architecture.

The need of the hour is to dismantle, or at least limit the IPR regime, which promotes profits for a few at the cost of lives of the people. With the world facing such unprecedented public health crisis, it is important that the TRIPS obligations are waived off, at least until the situation comes under control, as mentioned in the India-South Africa proposal. A collective global struggle is required towards ensuring that the interests of people are given precedence over profits and the greed of capital!

 

Fog over Covid-19 Vaccines in India: All-India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN) Position Paper

click here to see the English pdf of AIPSNPositionPaper-Vaccine-Politics16Dec2020

Click here to see the Hindi pdf of AIPSN position paper

Click here to see Tamil pdf of AIPSN position paper

Fog over Covid-19 Vaccines in India

All-India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN) Position Paper

16 Dec 2020

Many new developments have come about in recent weeks regarding Vaccines against Covid19 both internationally and in India. These have raised some optimism, but also several concerns about vaccine politics, undue commercial influence and other extraneous factors playing out around the world and, specifically, in India. This Position Paper focuses chiefly on India, within the global context, whereas international dimensions have been dealt with in a separate Statement and the Indian response to EUA for vaccines was highlighted in another Statement.

AIPSN calls for a science-based, equitable and rigorously conceived nation-wide policy in India for development, manufacture and deployment of vaccines in a free, universal vaccination strategy against Covid-19 as discussed below.

 

  1. Context and Status

Accelerated development and deployment of a safe and effective vaccine is crucial to combat the rampaging Covid-19 pandemic to protect individuals and enable full and safe re-opening of the economy and society. Access to free vaccination is essential for people’s right to life and health, since the disease has a significant burden of preventable morbidity or serious illness and mortality or deaths. Though the proportion of infected persons who get serious disease is low, in absolute numbers the number of persons who are at risk is unacceptably high. Free vaccination is also necessary since it is low-income working people who have paid the maximum social costs of the lock-down and disruption of the economy, and because vaccine development has mostly been done with public funds. At the same time, a nationwide vaccination programme is a challenge and raises crucial questions including with regard to the preparedness of the public health system in India to deliver this without compromising other essential health services.

Internationally, some leading vaccine candidates have, in recent weeks, declared high levels of efficacy or effectiveness based on preliminary results from on-going Phase-3 clinical trials. US-German Pfizer-BioNTech and US-based Moderna have both declared efficacy of above 90% for their two-dose  vaccines and applied for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) in the US and Conditional Marketing Agreement (CMA) in EU. Both these vaccines are relatively expensive (at around USD 40 (Pfizer) and USD 70 (Moderna) for two doses) and, importantly, require very low temperature cold chains, adding to the costs and delivery challenges for India and other developing countries. At the time of writing, Pfizer has obtained a global first EUA in the UK and subsequently in Bahrain, Canada, and US.

UK-based Oxford University-Astra Zeneca, which is partnering with the world’s largest vaccine manufacture Pune-based Serum Institute of India (SII), for mass production of its vaccine, has claimed average 70% efficacy across different modes and 90% efficacy at specific dosages. This double-dose vaccine is expected to be relatively inexpensive at around USD 6 and, significantly, can be stored at ordinary refrigerator temperatures, making delivery easier in India and other developing countries. SII has publicly claimed that it would be supplying around 300 million doses for India by mid-2021.

Russia’s RDIF-Gamaleya Institute too has declared effectiveness of over 90% for its “experimental” Sputnik-V vaccine. The powdered version requires storage at refrigerator-like temperatures, while the liquid version has to be at -18 deg C. The vaccine is expected to cost about USD 20 for 2 doses. This vaccine is undergoing Phase-3 trials in different countries including India and is to be manufactured by Hetero Biopharma in Hyderabad.

China’s Sinovac is being deployed widely in China and also in Brazil, and is gearing up for global supply when regulatory approvals are obtained, with a price tag internationally of around USD 60 for two doses and also requiring only refrigerator-like temperatures. Again at the time of writing, another China-origin vaccine from Sinopharm has been declared by the UAE as having 86% efficacy in Phase-3 trials in that country where it had been given EUA in September for front-line workers, but data from the trials are still not public.

These developments represent a significant achievement for science and medical research, because these promising results, however limited and preliminary have been attained in less than a year from the outbreak of the Covid-19 disease compared to the normally expected several years for vaccine development.

However, detailed data related to all these vaccine trials have not yet been published or peer-reviewed, which would bring out additional and important information such as effectiveness in different age-groups and segments of the population, prevention or reduction of severe illness and deaths, prevention of transmission, duration of immunity or protection etc. These properties may vary for different vaccines and may influence choices for deployment. Other vaccine candidates too are at various stages of clinical trials, and may similarly also obtain EUA over the next 3-6 months.

Therefore, questions have already been raised about how scientific, rigorous or transparent these EUAs have been. Both “vaccine nationalism” and commercial interests are known to be deeply involved, apart from panic response by governments in the face of failures to control the pandemic, as evidenced by pronouncements of government spokespersons in many countries including in India. The sharp rise of concerned company values in stock markets could also be contributing to the haste in these announcements.

In India, several indigenously developed vaccine candidates have also come to the forefront in recent weeks. Leading candidates are from ICMR/NIV-Bharat Biotech in Hyderabad, Zydus Cadilla in Ahmadabad and Gennova in Pune. There are already undergoing, or soon to start, Phase-3 trials and are expected to become available in early to mid-2021. Some other promising indigenous candidates are a few months behind. The Gennova vaccine, co-developed with HDT Biotech of the US and supported through seed funding by Department of Biotechnology (DBT), which has also supported indigenous development of some other vaccines, has recently received approval to start Phase-1 and 2 clinical human trials in India. This vaccine is of particular importance for future scientific and medical research in India since it is the first indigenous development of an mRNA (messenger RNA) vaccine, using a technology that may also be very useful for new-generation pharmaceuticals for treatment of infectious diseases and cancers.

After the Prime Minister’s recent visits to and meetings with several of these companies to encourage them in their efforts, he is reported to have also instructed the regulatory agencies to facilitate the expedited approvals process. It is important that data from clinical trials for all these candidates are scientifically assessed without “vaccine nationalism,” pressure from political or commercial interests, cronyism or favoritism and also meet high standards of efficacy and safety, especially since high efficacy percentages have  been announced by  leading international candidates.

 

 

  1. Need for transparent, science-based trials and approvals

In this context, extraneous considerations do appear to be creating untoward interference in scientific processes involved in vaccine trials, assessments and expedited or emergency approvals with implications for deployment as well. There are indications, covered in the media and supported by several experts, that ongoing clinical trials for vaccine candidates are “designed to succeed” in several ways.

It may be recalled that the Director General, Indian Council for Medical Research (ICMR) had, earlier this year, written to all hospitals where clinical trials were underway demanding that they expedite results by 15th August this year, clearly to enable a grand announcement from the Red Fort. Fortunately, a massive outcry by scientists, medical professionals and civil society organizations brought about a retreat from this blatant attempt at pressurization. However, the danger remains in many ways.

Thresholds for efficacy or effectiveness (i.e. the percentage of infections the vaccine prevents), different aspects of efficacy as discussed earlier, as well as the sample size required for grant of EUA, may be lowered to enable vaccine candidates to more easily pass the test. While anxiety to roll-out an indigenous vaccine quickly through EUA is understandable for several reasons, it is crucial that clinical trials and assessments of results are, and continue to be, conducted transparently by scientific-medical Data Review Boards independent of political and bureaucratic influence, and results be made public and, when completed Phase-3 trials, be published and subject to peer review. This is essential to build global and domestic public confidence in Indian-origin vaccines.

In this context, it is a matter of considerable satisfaction that the Subject Expert Committee (SEC) of the Central Drugs Standards Control Organization (DSCCO), at its meeting on 9th December 2020, has kept pending its consideration on the applications for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of Covid-19 Vaccines by SII and Bharat Biotech, and has asked for additional information. The regulatory agency Drugs Controller General of India (DGCI) was to have decided on grant of EUA based on SEC’s recommendations. The SEC has, at least for now, rightly asserted its responsibility for scientific assessment of Covid vaccine candidates independent of political, bureaucratic or commercial interests.

The SEC decision has come against the background of considerable pressure from different levels of government, such as several recent public statements by the Health Secretary, Dr.V.K.Paul of Niti Aayog heading the National Task Force on Covid-19, and by DG ICMR. These officials pushed for a quick grant of EUA for these and other applicants, rather than respecting due process and scientific evaluation of data relating to safety and efficacy.

Urgency for approval and deployment of vaccines is no doubt important, but not at the cost of safety or potential impact in tackling the pandemic. More robust data would be available soon, providing opportunity to “hasten slowly”.  Self-reliance and encouraging indigenous research and manufacturing industry too are important, but sloppy or unscientific decision-making relating to public health will only damage the reputation of Indian science and regulatory processes, far outweighing any brownie points gained by rolling-out vaccination a few weeks early. Problematic EUA approval may also add to existing vaccine skepticism or hesitancy among the public.

The SEC and DCGI should therefore fearlessly conduct a thorough scientific assessment of available early data from Phase-3 trials in India or abroad, resisting pressure from different quarters. SEC/DCGI should also release the data based on which any recommendation is made so as to enhance transparency and secure the confidence of the scientific and medical community in India and internationally. This is especially crucial if India is to contribute to the global fight against the Covid-19 pandemic through its indigenously developed and manufactured vaccines. While granting EUA, it is also important to set up extensive surveillance of the vaccination programme, and to continue with rigorous Phase-III trials and peer review and publication of its data.

It must be also understood that, at this stage of development of different vaccines, it is not clear whether each vaccine is efficient at preventing infection, as distinct from preventing serious disease or mortality. It is also important to know whether infection can spread from persons administered specific vaccines, and the duration for which each vaccine protects persons. These specificities need to be taken into account for decisions on deployment. These unknowns at the present stage and the need to find answers them underline the necessity for continuation of clinical trials involving the larger numbers of enrolled volunteers, extensive post-vaccination surveillance and, importantly, continuing with all other public health measures of disease prevention and epidemic management.

 

The reputation of India’s science, vaccine manufacturing industry and regulatory institutions depends heavily on such unbiased, rigorous and science-based assessments, since India could potentially emerge, now or in the future, as a major exporter of low-cost indigenously developed vaccines especially to other developing countries.

 

  1. Free and Transparent Vaccine deployment strategy

Ruling parties in different States are making promises of free vaccines to all, especially in the run-up to State elections. The nation needs a science-based and nationwide policy on vaccine deployment to be implemented by States with additional measures if desired, keeping in mind, the phased availability of different vaccines. The National Task Force on Covid-19 headed by Dr.V.K.Paul of Niti Aayog recently announced a prioritization roadmap proposing to initially vaccinate health care workers, other frontline workers, security personnel and those above 50 years of age and persons with co-morbidities, amounting to an estimated 300 million persons, starting perhaps in March 2021.

A clear, well reasoned and long term vaccination roadmap is required, especially keeping in mind the different indigenous vaccines set to obtain regulatory approval in the near future.  The policy needs to more definitively identify those included in the category of “frontline workers,” how senior citizens and those with co-morbidities would be enumerated, address phase-wise coverage of the rest of the population especially children and young adults not mentioned so far but whose immunization against Covid is necessary for early and much-needed resumption of safe and regular in-person education. It is also important to specify which categories of the population, such as infants or the elderly, would be immunized using which vaccine, depending on the efficacy characteristics of available vaccines.

The Prime Minister in his televised address to the nation on October 20 assured that the government seeks to ensure “delivery of the vaccine to every citizen.” However, the Health Secretary in the presence of DG ICMR stated categorically that the government has never committed to universal vaccination which was in fact not necessary since  the need is only to break the chain of transmission and obtain ‘herd immunity,’ and therefore the government may not vaccinate the entire population. It would, however, be extremely difficult to decide which sections to leave out of the vaccination programme and explain such a decision, since this would raise serious apprehensions of discrimination or injustice on different grounds.

Further, although achieving a threshold level of herd immunity (loosely estimated at 60% of the population) could prevent epidemic spread, the disease would still remain endemic in the country especially in population sub-groups, with significant numbers developing the disease and more limited outbreaks continuing in different parts of the country. Similar phenomena are seen in diseases like measles and diphtheria. The more skewed the demographic characteristics of the persons immunized, the less would be the braking effect of herd immunity.

In the Indian context, equity as a value and principle demands that those least able to practice social distancing, because of working and living conditions, need it most. All things considered universal vaccination may be the best option to prevent arbitrariness, real or perceived discrimination and emergence of a black market, besides enabling more robust and sustainable disease control.

A danger is that many Vaccine manufacturers in India and other corporate interests are already lobbying for the Government to allow delivery of vaccines by the private health sector at market prices to those who can afford to pay, as was done in Covid Tests and Hospital charges. Such a vaccine deployment strategy would, however, completely undermine equity and divert precious vaccine doses to privileged paying sections away from the vast poor underprivileged masses, and would also distort government procurement and equitable vaccination.

It is therefore essential that the Government of India announces a clear and transparent vaccination programme including a categorical and binding commitment to a programme of free universal vaccination with a fair and transparent policy of phase-wise prioritization for different segments of the population so as to ensure access to most vulnerable segments and marginalized sections.

 

  1. Obstacles to domestic manufacturing and deployment

            There is much confusion regarding the Indian government’s participation in COVAX, the newly created global institution under the Global Vaccine Initiative (GAVI) and WHO. COVAX is funded by donor countries, corporate philanthropy notably the Gates Foundation and Wellcome Trust, as well as the 10% down payment from self-funded participating countries. COVAX has provided financing to different vaccine developers and manufacturers in exchange for a proportion of vaccines produced, all through confidential agreements. COVAX also has agreements with participating countries to provide upto 20% of their vaccine requirement, for the duration of the agreement period which is now only till end-2021, with special arrangements for lower income countries. On the other hand, rich countries with 13% of the world’s population have already purchased over 50% of the world’s scheduled vaccine production and many other such bilateral agreements have been signed.

In this context, several Indian vaccine manufacturers who have agreements to manufacture leading vaccines developed elsewhere, would be bound by confidential agreements made with COVAX and also with their corporate partners as regards prices and supply schedules. Voluntary licenses granted by vaccine developers to Indian manufacturers prevent the latter from transferring the technology to other Indian companies or from exporting to countries not covered by COVAX.  It would therefore be difficult for Indian vaccine manufacturers to scale-up vaccine production and supply to the levels required by India.

Government of India needs to work out how to overcome this problem. It is recommended that any agreements India signs with COVAX should be within an improved framework and its governance made more multilateral and democratic with a greater role for WHO, and removal of corporate influence. Government should also make public to the Indian people the terms and conditions of agreements with COVAX.

The government should urgently evolve and implement measures for scaling up manufacture of the most appropriate vaccines for our needs, through support to existing  manufacturing units in private sector to expand their capacity and by encouraging public sector manufacture in this area irrespective of the vaccine being indigenously developed or licensed from international pharmaceuticals.

 

  1. Strengthen the public health system

Finally it should be emphasized that the vaccination programme will require massive strengthening and mobilization of the public health system in India including for follow-up, monitoring of side-effects and efficacy. The capacity of current cold chain infrastructure is only about 50% of what is required even for the existing package of immunization. The human resources gaps are also huge. Procuring, storing and distributing and administering vaccines to close to 800 million more persons, even if phased is going to require considerable expansion of cold chains equipment, infrastructure, refrigerated transport vehicles, and  skilled human resources at the field level.

Therefore any plan for vaccine deployment, must also make a firm and quantified commitment to increased financing of the public health system. In the absence of such a commitment, the vaccination programme will suffer and other essential health services including child immunization would also be undermined by large scale diversion of existing public health resources.

 

  1. AIPSN Demands

The Government of India needs to urgently undertake the following so as to ensure a safe, effective and free universal vaccination programme against Covid-19:

  1. Scrupulously monitor Phase-3 clinical trials for all indigenously developed vaccines and, after robust and independent scientific assessment of efficacy with peer review of trial results, grant Emergency Use Authorization within a definitive deadline within which such approvals can be applied for;
  2. Rapidly scale up manufacturing capacity by recruiting and re-tooling both public sector as well as private sector manufacturing units for both internationally and indigenously developed vaccines;
  3. Ensure transparency of agreements that Indian manufacturers have signed or may sign with COVAX/GAVI and Corporates. These may require further arrangements for systematic transfer of technology from international vaccine developers to Indian manufacturers to enable effective and rapid scaling-up manufacture and deployment in India;
  4. Make public the basis of approval, including evidence reviewed, provide details of the protocol, process and timelines followed in investigating any reported severe adverse events (SAEs);
  5. Make public the Government’s stand on indemnifying vaccine manufacturers;
  6. Actively advocate and lobby for declaration of all vaccines developed worldwide as global public goods and, if patents remain an obstacle, take steps to use compulsory licensing if necessary;
  7. Bring out a white paper on the system and related costs for vaccine procurement and delivery, along with details of the expansion of public health infrastructure and human resources that would go with it;
  8. Set up a Parliamentary Committee to oversee the implementation of the Covid-19 Vaccination programme in an effective, timely and equitable manner and a broad based Advisory Committee including representation of the scientific community and civil society organizations.

 

For clarifications contact:

P.Rajamanickam 9442915101;T.Sundararaman 99874388253;D. Raghunandan 9810098621

Statement On Scientific, Independent and Transparent Process for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of anti-Covid Vaccines in India

 

click here to see pdf of All India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN) Statement 

On Scientific, Independent and Transparent Process for

Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of anti-Covid Vaccines in India

 

AIPSN expresses satisfaction that the Subject Expert Committee (SEC) of the Central Drugs Standards Control Organization (DSCCO), at its meeting on 9th December 2020, has kept pending any recommendations on applications for Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) of Covid-19 Vaccines by Serum Institute of India (SII) manufacturing the Oxford Astra Zeneca vaccine of the UK, and by Bharat Biotech making the indigenously developed ICMR/NIV vaccine. The SEC sought additional data from SII relating to its Phase-III trials in India and the pending regulatory approval process in the UK. In the case of Bharat Biotech, the SEC said it would proceed only after reviewing data from its on-going Phase-3 trials in India, whereas it had submitted only Phase-I/II data.  The regulatory agency Drugs Controller General of India (DGCI) was to have decided on grant of EUA based on the recommendations of the SEC. The SEC, at least for now, has rightly asserted its role regarding scientific assessment of vaccine candidates independent of political, bureaucratic or commercial interests.

The SEC decision has come against the context of several recent public statements by the Health Secretary, Dr.V.K.Paul of Niti Aayog heading the National Task Force, and by DG ICMR pushing for a quick grant of EUA for these and other applicants, rather than respecting due process and sientific evaluation of data relating to safety and efficacy. DG ICMR in particular sought to undermine the importance of Phase-III trials data and suggested that some vague “cost-benefit assessment” would instead suffice for granting EUA, ignoring the obvious conflict of interest since one of the candidates has indeed been developed by an IMR laboratory!

The urgency for approval and deployment of vaccines is no doubt of importance, but not at the cost of safety or potential impact in reducing infection, transmission and severe illness or mortality. Robust data enabling a more scientific and considered decision based on Phase-3 trials data, whether from India or abroad, is likely to become available in a few weeks in any case. With the national case load on a declining trend, there is opportunity to hasten slowly as WHO recommends.  Self-reliance and encouraging indigenous research and manufacturing industry are undoubtedly important, but sloppy or unscientific decision-making relating to public health will only damage the reputation of Indian science and regulatory processes, far outweighing any brownie points gained by rolling-out of a vaccination programme a few weeks early, but which may later turn out to be problematic. Rolling out a vaccine without a proper appraisal of safety and efficacy may also lead to a backlash, adding to existing vaccine skepticism or hesitancy.

AIPSN therefore calls upon the SEC and DCGI to fearlessly conduct a thorough scientific assessment of available early data from Phase-3 trials in India or abroad independent of political, bureaucratic and commercial interests in deciding upon EUA for different vaccine candidates. AIPSN further calls for releasing the data based on which any recommendation is made in the interests of transparency, gain confidence of the scientific and medical community in India and internationally, and so as to allay any fears about safety and efficacy of vaccines to be rolled out. This is especially crucial if India is to contribute to the global fight against the Covid-19 pandemic through its indigenously developed vaccines. While granting EUA, it is also important to set up extensive surveillance of the vaccination programme, and to continue with rigorous Phase-III trials and peer review and publication of its data.

For clarifications contact:

  1. Rajamanickam 9442915101 T. Sundararaman 99874388253  D. Raghunandan  9810098621

Feedback submitted to MoHFW on draft Health Data Management Policy (HDMP) -with related aspects of the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM)

Click here to see the pdf of the submission AIPSN2MoHFW-on-NDHMDataPolicy2020unsd

ALL INDIA PEOPLE’s SCIENCE NETWORK (AIPSN)

Regd. No. PKD/CA/62/2020.

AIPSN Central Secretariat,                                                    E-mail: gsaipsn@gmail.com

o/o Tamil Nadu Science Forum                                              Ph: 094429 15101

6, Kakkathoppu Street, MUTA Building,                              Twitter: @gsaipsn

Madurai-625 001-Tamil Nadu                                                website: https://aipsn.net

 

President:                               General Secretary:                                        Treasurer:

Dr. S.Chatterjee                    Prof. P.Rajamanickam                                 Dr.S.Krishnaswamy

                                                                                                                                    19.9.2020

To

Feedback on NDHM policies

National Health Authority

Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

9th Floor, Tower-l, Jeevan Bharati Building, Connaught Place,

New Delhi – 110 001

e-mail address: ndhm@nha.gov.in

 

Sir,

Sub: Comments and feedback on NDHM policies

Ref: Draft Health Data Management Policy

https://ndhm.gov.in/stakeholder_consultations/ndhm_policies

 

Following the extension of the notice period for draft Health Data Management Policy till 21st September, we offer the following response to draft Health Data Management Policy (HDMP)

-with related aspects of the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM) for your consideration and also insist that the responses received and discussions be placed transparently in a public accessible website.

Do acknowledge receipt of this response.

Thanking you in anticipation and with regards

 

Yours sincerely

P.Rajamanickam

General Secretary, AIPSN

 A Network of 40 People’s Science Movements working in 25 states

 

————————————-

Response to draft Health Data Management Policy (HDMP)

-with related aspects of the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM)

 

 

  1. Extend the date for comments:

The period given for public responses to the Draft HDMP has been extremely short, making any intensive and detailed consultation with different stakeholders especially under constraints of Covid-related restrictions virtually impossible. The All India Peoples Science Network (AIPSN), arguably the largest civil society organization in science and technology, at the outset calls for an extension of the last date for comments at least to end of November, 2020 if not later. Further, Draft HDMP cannot be discussed in isolation, without also discussing the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM) announced by the PM as late as 15th August this year and the Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB) 2019 which is still under discussion in Parliament.  The current effort seeks to rush through a number of policies without due consultations with States, health providers or specialized digital health experts. The lack of such consultation shows up in many weaknesses and inconsistencies in the draft HDMP which require much deeper debate. Nevertheless, AIPSN offers some preliminary comments within the current deadline of 21st September 2020. If MoHFW extends the last date, AIPSN may submit a fresh and more detailed Response.

 

  1. Discuss only along with National Digital Health Mission:

AIPSN notes that the HDMP is a subset of the NDHM, documents related to which became available barely two weeks ago. Public comments and discussion of the HDMP should include a discussion on the NDHM which itself has several serious flaws with direct impact on HDMP.  There are also significant areas where these two policy documents are not aligned, notably with respect to PDPB and many key features and assurances.

 

  1. Discuss only along with Personal Data Protection Bill 2019:

It is shocking that the HDMP makes no mention of the Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 currently before Parliament. It is simply not possible to discuss, leave alone adopt, a policy dealing with health data of citizens without adequate safeguards for such data which is the very subject of that Bill. It is essential that HDMP be discussed and adopted only after adoption of the PDPB. Government should also be interested in avoiding any impression that the HDMP seeks to evade or circumvent provisions of that Bill.

 

  1. Unaccountable and arbitrary governance by the Executive:

The HDMP section on governance needs to be rejected outright and comprehensively re-written.  In its current formulation (Section 6, p.6), HDMP would be governed by structures and rules created from time to time by the National Health Authority (NHA). The NHA, despite its name, has not been created through an Act of Parliament unlike the National Highways Authority or Telecom Regulatory Authority. It was created as the National Health Agency in 2017 for the sole purpose of managing the PM Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY), and later declared an “authority” by a Cabinet order and placed under Niti Aayog. Thus HDMP governance now stands to be an executive or departmental function, each policy or action is subject to change at any time by executive order, and rights described in HDMP would not be legally enforceable by citizens. The Aadhar experience has shown how a policy that began with assurances of voluntary participation gradually became a mandatory requirement by a series of executive orders. Further, NHA creates a government appointed Data Protection Officer who will have wide ranging and ambiguous powers. In the HDMP, both the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare (MoHFW) and Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MEIT) are marginalized, and therefore so is all parliamentary scrutiny. However, the NDHM policy document visualizes the legal and regulatory framework as part of the functions of MoHFW and MEIT, and not of the NHA. The NDHM also has a Mission Steering Group and Empowered Committee which are not mentioned in HDMP. The governance provisions of HDMP also do not match those proposed in the Personal Data Protection Bill which calls for a separate legally mandated Data Authority, with which the NDHM document in turn promises to align. Clearly, the governance structures and mechanisms of HDMP are arbitrary, unaccountable and subject to executive whims, not aligned with either NDHM or PDPB, and hence completely unacceptable.

 

  1. Need for Legislation:

It is necessary that the National Health Authority and its mandate to manage the NDHM and the HDMP should be secured in appropriate legislation passed by Parliament after the Personal Data Protection Bill is enacted.

 

  1. Not fit for purpose:

Another major issue with governance of HDMP, and of NDHM, is that the “fit for purpose” of all the digital health data collected and processed, and how these relate to the broader health ecosystem, are inadequately addressed. Health data digitization and management is viewed in HDMP as a stand-alone purpose, which may serve the interests of the telecom, data, corporate health and insurance industries, but it is not clear how this will enable  better access to, or quality of, public health services, or how this would improve health outcomes for citizens with dignity and privacy.

 

  1. HDMP focus is individual data not public health informatics:

Flowing from this, HDMP engages only with personal health data records in its objectives (Section 3, p.2). There is no objective relating to disease prevalence, infection control (even at the time of a huge pandemic), morbidity and mortality estimates, or expenditure on healthcare etc. Thus the entire exercise is focused only on individual case management as is applicable to an insurance company or health management organization. The NDHM strategy document does mention public health outcomes, but predominant focus is still on individual health data, which may have salience for pharma and insurance companies or health management institutions, but not on informatics for public health. Information of public health importance could theoretically flow out of individual digital health records, but experience in India shows that this does not reflect reality due to a number of structural barriers. Such data collection, processing and linkage with a public health system requires very high levels of investment and technical capability in the Indian environment of highly atomized and often non-institutional health care encounters.  For most of India’s population, the absence of a digital health data file which contains, to quote the PM’s Independence Day speech, “details of every test, every disease, the doctors you visited, the medicines you took and the diagnosis,” is not the critical problem. Getting a proper and affordable consultation in a public health facility, being able to pay for medicines prescribed, getting a bed in an affordable facility, these are day-to-day challenges. Once again, the public health utility of the proposed digital health data system, and the huge amount of funds required for it, are highly questionable.

 

  1. Illusory power of data principals:

HDMP’s framework on consent of individuals (data principals) regarding their personal health data (Section 3) contains assurances that cannot be taken seriously. For example, it is stated that “data principals would have complete control and decision-making power over the manner in which personal or sensitive personal data associated with them is collected and processed further.” However, given the high levels of information asymmetry (i.e. that there is a big gap in knowledge between citizens and data professionals about health data, their uses and implications for patient confidentiality) even most educated middle class persons would not be able to exercise such control. Further, persons seeking healthcare have high vulnerability, would be in no position to bargain over their data rights, nor would it be possible even for those collecting data to inform them adequately of such rights.  Contradicting itself in a later section, the right of data principals to erase their health data is so highly restricted and so conditional in HDMP that, in practical terms, there is a total loss of control over one’s data.

 

  1. No need for unique health ID with problematic scope:

The need to create a unique health ID and the scope of such a health ID, as prescribed in HDMP are both highly problematic. Although a bland assurance is given that lack of this Health ID cannot be a basis for denial of healthcare, this assurance is far from convincing, given past experience with Aadhar and the Aarogya Setu App. An ID is made essential for all heath care users, health providers, professionals, facilities and data operators to be part of the scheme. And once insurance schemes and healthcare providers move to this platform, all access to publicly financed healthcare would become inaccessible without such a platform and ID. When the current standards of practice are that patients with life-threatening illnesses are being denied treatment due to the lack of an Aadhar card, it would be foolish to believe that this ID will not be mandatory in one form or another. The stated uses of a unique health ID, like portability of personal health information, can just as easily be achieved with any of the many existing IDs. It is to be noted that the NDHM strategy document also clearly states that “all government health programmes… are required to integrate with the service and issue Health IDs as part of their programs. This will ensure that health information from visit to public health facilities and those being captured across various health programs like RCH, NIKSHAY, NCD, PMJAY will be included in the patients’ longitudinal health record.” This clearly shows that the Health IDs are meant to be system-wide and compulsory in practice.

 

  1. IT System(s) problems:

It is common these days to see considerable enthusiasm in government programmes for digital data and IT data processing and management systems, almost as if by their mere introduction, they would provide a panacea to solving all our problems! Unfortunately, there is little attempt to critically review or reflect upon the rather mixed experience so far. In this light, while it is welcome that HDMP talks of open source software and open standards, it does not reflect on the sobering fact that these have been MEIT policy for two decades now, and yet India is no closer to its realization. The HDMP itself calls for compliance with standards like Snomed-CT which, irrespective of merits, is not open standard at all, and is closely wedded to healthcare digitization practices in the US. Similarly, while there is much brave talk of inter-operability and federated structures, there is little understanding or discussion of why India currently has dozens of parallel IT systems in the Centre and in the States. Most of these IT systems are sub-functional or dysfunctional, completely unable to talk to each other, and often have vendor lock-ins which has been a roadblock to future development. Neither the NDHM strategy nor the HDMP show awareness of these and other risks including, for example, the marketing practices of private sector vendors, or the duplication and fragmentation of data.

 

  1. No Penalties, weak grievance redressal:

There is no clarity in HDMP or NDHM as to what penalties would be incurred or compensation provided if and when citizens’ rights are violated, or how violations can be traced. The accountability of data management firms provided for is essentially that they would be de-empanelled, but this would not be easy, when they hold health records of a large proportion of the population. The grievance redressal mechanisms in HDMP are also extremely weak.

 

  1. Dangers of State Surveillance and growing authoritarianism:

There is growing danger in India from the increasing resort to gathering and storing of citizens’ data through various means, including through often mandatory digitization of citizens’ access to government services, all in the name of either greater efficiency of service delivery or national security. The extreme centralization of such data and the lack of transparency and accountability regarding use of this data especially by security agencies have heightened fears of enhanced and dangerous state surveillance of civic life, especially in the context of growing authoritarian trends in the country. So, even though the Health ID and personal health data are not really a priority or even irrelevant for public health needs as discussed above, they can be used for surveillance purposes. The repeated assertion in the NDHM Strategy that all registries and other master databases of NDHM will be built as “Single Source of Truth” on different aspects and backed by strong data governance is a matter of great concern. Countries with longer and arguably stronger liberal traditions have consciously insisted on multiple sources of identity and information, precisely in order to protect citizens from capture of knowledge by centralized executive power. Conversely, erasure of data from a centralized data base could lead to a total destruction of all identity, entitlements and rights. These anxieties require to be addressed.

 

  1. Opening pathways to corporate Profits:

HDMP enables and enhances corporate profits in five significant ways:

  1. immediate beneficiaries are IT companies who would get large new lucrative contracts.
  2. IT industry in general also benefits through data mining and commercialization of personal and aggregate health data.
  • digital health care corporates such as e-pharmacies, related e-retailers, e-consultations and prescriptions, e-diagnostics would benefit by obtaining increasing share of retail healthcare.
  1. insurance companies would benefit enormously by obtaining personal health information, targeting consumers of insurance products, and adjusting premiums, etc.
  2. perhaps the main danger is the space and opportunity opened up in India for multinational health management organizations and healthcare corporates to penetrate the Indian healthcare industry. There is already a fairly high flow of FDI into the hospital and insurance sector following gradual and diminishing controls. NDHM and HDMP now enable corporate penetration into the primary and secondary healthcare segment, and that too in Tier-2 and Tier-3 towns and cities by a process of aggregation and consolidation of small-scale providers on one hand, and increasing restriction of public providers to residual health care on the other. In other words, public providers would be limited to providing care only for those disease conditions and those people that the private sector is not interested in.

 

 

For clarifications contact:

  1. Rajamanickam 9442915101 T. Sundararaman 99874388253  D. Raghunandan  9810098621

Joint Letter to Govt of India endorsed by 8 organisations and 145 individuals on Arogya Setu and other apps introduced during Covid19 pandemic

Click here to see the  Gmail – Joint Letter on Aarogya Setu and other COVID-19 apps

Click here to see the Joint Letter on Aarogya Setu by IFF, JSA, AISPN, FMES and other organisations and concerned individuals

 

Click here to view in FMES site

To
Dr. Harsh Vardhan, Union Minister, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India
Email: hfm@gov.in
Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister, Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India
Email: ravis@sansad.nic.in
Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Chairperson, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology
Email: office@tharoor.in, legislation@tharoor.in
17 September 2020
Subject: Technical, legal, ethical and implementation concerns regarding Aarogya Setu and other
apps introduced during COVID-19 in India
Dear sir,
We, the eight organisations and 145 individuals, consisting of public health advocates, experts in digital privacy, science and technology policy advocates, researchers, lawyers, journalists, medical professionals, students and other concerned persons want to express our deep concerns regarding the Aarogya Setu (AS) and other similar Apps related to the novel Corona virus epidemic. We are deeply concerned about violation of privacy, and compromised ethical principles and values, due to the AS App’s design, its deployment, related policies regarding data storage, preservation of privacy and data sharing, as well as overall policy implementation and inadequate legal frameworks for data protection and grievance redressal for users.
We appreciate the need of the hour viz.:
1. the unprecedented nature and massive impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in India
2. the need for a multi-pronged approach to contain the pandemic and minimize its adverse impact on all
domains of our lives
3. therefore the need for innovative approaches, including digital technology-based ones, that may be required to augment and complement other containment and mitigation measures. We believe that the key challenge is ensuring that a balance is struck between achieving greater public good and safeguarding individuals’ rights and freedoms in alignment with frameworks provided by the Constitution of India, public health ethics discourse, International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005), the Siracusa Principles on Civil and Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In this context, we conducted a detailed analysis of the AS App purposed as a catch-all solution, its Privacy Policy, Terms of Services (henceforth ToS) and Aarogya Setu Data Access and Knowledge Sharing Protocol, 2020 (henceforth, Protocol), and its code available on GitHub taking into account the broader eco-system in which Aarogya Setu has been deployed and is being used. This is presented in the more detailed position paper (attached as Annexure 1) which informs this statement articulating key issues across five domains viz., technical and platform design; legal and policy frames; transparency and public engagement; eco-system in India in which the App has been deployed; and ethics and human rights.
The key issues that we want to highlight are as follows:
I. Technical and platform design domain
At a technical level, the AS App does not conform to key technical best practices being developed internationally.

The following major concerns arise:
1. The AS App collects people’s GPS trails about which many democracies, technologists and the World Health Organisation (WHO) have had concerns. It uses centralised social graph analysis to map interactions between individuals, thereby contravening the strongly supported decentralised data storage systems which safeguards citizens’ real-world activities. It also uses a static Device ID which is rudimentary, and is prone to risks of re-identification (i.e. the anonymised personal data may be matched with the actual person thereby exposing who the person is).
2. The AS App’s centralised data storage system enables exporting of people’s sensitive personal details to an external government-operated server which is linked with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) database and others. These are being provided to third parties such as research universities and private consultancy firms. Overall, this is an expansive approach to data collection and extraction, and clearly undermines privacy of people’s data.
3. The AS App categorizes people as being at high risk of COVID-19 simply based on the App’s opaque algorithm and inaccurate Bluetooth and GPS based proximity tracking. This creates a non-trivial risk of false positives and negatives, leading to other severe social, personal and public health consequences. The use of self-reported symptoms also runs the risk of people wrongly marking themselves as positive or negative.
4. The AS App is not accessible to people with disabilities, especially those with vision and hearing disabilities.
II. Legal and policy domain
1. Aarogya Setu App’s privacy policy or supporting documents such as its ToS and the Protocol, assert that data retention or deletion requirements do not apply to people’s data which has been “anonymised” and can therefore be seamlessly shared with third parties.

This raises three key issues:
a. standards of ‘anonymization’ are not defined in the ToS and the Protocol
b. standards if any are not shared with the user and no consent sought for using their “anonymized” data
c. there is no sunset clause for the personal data AS App collects. The, “sunset” is to the protocol rather than the underlying personal data. This evokes concerns of permanent surveillance
2. The data security and protection framework under the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011, are not applicable to government authorities, so there is no automatic or compulsory privacy protection
3. The voluntary Electronic Health Records Standards which provide certain privacy and security protocols for data disclosures during times of national priority, lacks suitable enforceability.
4. The latest draft of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 introduced in India’s Parliament in December 2019 is insufficient. It grants omnibus exemptions to Governments for emergency/epidemic situations which is inconsistent with the contours of the right to privacy and reasonable restrictions during emergency situations as prescribed by the Supreme Court of India in its seminal right to privacy judgement in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017).
5. Obligations under the IHR 2005 to which India is legally bound, require governments to ensure that national legislative frameworks relating to data sharing are adopted and be consistent with international human rights frameworks and foundational ethical principles. Lack of such legal framework in India implies lack of protection from potential commercial surveillance.
6. From a policy perspective, there is no independent institutional oversight on (a) public agencies and the businesses developing these Apps; (b) ethical and human rights aspects; and (c) the App’s actual deployment.

III. Transparency and public engagement domain
1. As per information in the public domain, Government of India (GoI), had initiated building of the AS App on March 19, 2020, and it was launched on April 2, 2020. As per standard best practice, GoI should have issued a technical whitepaper and consulted the public and external stakeholders before launching the App. However, even now, more than four months since the AS App’s launch, GoI has not published any such document.
2. The lack of a structured public debate and public engagement around the AS App raises questions about its quality, and about the adequacy of ethical, procedural or institutional safeguards to mitigate risks arising from such technological interventions.
3. The National Informatics Center (NIC) has informed the media that it opted for a public-private partnership model to develop the AS App. For example, For example, UX Design at MakeMyTrip has been a private volunteer in building these systems. This evokes concerns of commercial exploitation and risk to privacy of the data collected through the AS App.
4. The underlying source code of the AS App was also not released for the longest time which is, again, best practice in such cases. Eventually, the GoI released the source code but it has not yet released the server-side code or the cloud functions. Experts have observed that the source code released on GitHub is inconsistent with the App which is being used by the public. This has therefore only marginal value in terms of transparency and is inconsistent with globally accepted standards of open source software.
5. There is ambiguity in the key AS App documents namely ToS, Protocol, and Privacy Policy. These include inadequate information for AS App users about the type and purpose of data collected, where and for how long data will be stored, with whom these data will be shared and for what purposes. A NITI Aayog official has indicated that data collected via the AS App is feeding into the development of India/Bharat Health Stack and that raises various other concerns but will not be dealt with here.
6. There is inadequate transparency about the various data points and inputs the App’s algorithm relies upon to arrive at its risk scoring of users as green, yellow, orange or red.

IV. India’s eco-system in which AS App is deployed
1. Indian governance systems habitually work in silos and inter-departmental coordination is extremely weak. Potential usefulness of the deployment of AS App depends upon how well the App data and its processing system is linked to contact tracing, testing and treatment through a well-equipped and trained health system. Unfortunately, there has been surprisingly little information put out so far by concerned government agencies as to how such institutional linkages have worked and how the App data has been used.
2. innovations in collection and processing of citizens’ data must comply with broader legal and ethical frameworks and constitutional rights of citizens which have historically been weak and have come under increasing threat in recent times.
3. the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs is steering this effort instead of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, conveys that instead of linkage with testing and treatment, the AS App is more likely being purposed as a tool for surveillance and movement control, potentially leading to social coercion.

V. Constitutional and human rights, and public health ethics
1. The Medical Council of India’s Code of Ethics does not cover protocols for health data in circumstances when it is shared with the Government
2. The Government’s push to make the App effectively mandatory erodes individual autonomy as guaranteed by the Constitution
3. Critically, effectively mandatory use of the AS App is inconsistent with a recent WHO guidance on ethical considerations in the use of digital proximity tracing technologies.
4. The AS App’s Protocol is insufficient since it does not offer any legislative foundation for the AS App. Fundamental rights under the Constitution cannot be restricted by the Government even for legitimate purposes without express legislative authorisation.
5. Further, the Protocol fails to be consistent with standards of necessity and proportionality called for by both IHR 2005 and the Siracusa Principles. Specifically, it does not incorporate substantive language which sufficiently reigns in the government’s ability to collect, store, process, retain and process people’s sensitive personal details.

Against this backdrop, our demands are as follows:
I. For proportionality: Three points of emphasis must be design and architecture of the AS app; transparency and effective public engagement; and limits to retention time and use of the data.
1. There is a constitutional obligation to adopt the least restrictive/intrusive measure to achieve the stated purpose. These thresholds can be benchmarked against known technological best practices and models, and the kinds of interventions adopted by other constitutional democracies. The design of interventions must also ensure that they do not disproportionately impact people from certain backgrounds, identities, and regions.
2. A full release of specifications including cryptography, anonymization specifications, Application Programming Interface (API) specifications, and Bluetooth specifications.
3. Release of the source code for the current version of the AS App, given the fact that the released code does not match with the one in use, and release of the server-side code.
4. Development of a comprehensive privacy impact assessment, articulating accompanying risks associated with large scale roll-out of the App.
5. Commitment (i.e. sunset clauses that are clearly present in primary legislation) to permanently destroy the data and systems being built via AS App at the end of the COVID-19 pandemic.
6. The AS App must not in any way be made mandatory by government or private actors;
7. Among other things, the focus must be on assuring the public that these are temporary interventions which will not devolve into permanent surveillance and monitoring systems.

II. For legality
1. Suitable legislation is required aim to hold the Union and State governments and private actors accountable for leakage or any inappropriate use of App data during epidemics and communicable disease outbreaks.
2. Under this, governments may only access patient data through hospital records, and must preserve patient anonymity.
3. These frameworks should be solely under the control of public health institutions.

III. For necessity: The government must establish:
1. The contextual necessity of the new technological interventions like the AS App which monitors people’s movements since this is already being done by other actors (like telecom service providers).;
2. Grounds for treating the existing government databases, such as those maintained by ICMR and other existing surveillance mechanisms and hospital records as inadequate for the current purposes of responding to the pandemic
3. The expected advantage of interventions for collection of health and related information is collected, the actual technical effectiveness of the interventions itself, and a detailed cost-benefit/privacy impact analysis to evaluate risks before rolling out such Apps
4. Necessity as a dynamic construct, and that it is embedded through the life cycle of the AS programme. Within it there is a need for continual review of the programme as regards principles of transparency and accountability.

IV. Oversight Structures and Processes
1. The required legislation must create independent institutions for oversight separated from the political executive.
2. Towards this end, the agencies/institutions concerned should publish periodic reports informing the public if, and to what extent, the App is augmenting the Government’s response in treating and containing the spread of Covid-19. Based on such feedback loops, these institutions should be empowered to make decisions for course correction or even discontinuation of the programme itself, and the permanent destruction of the systems created.

We hope that you will take cognisance of these concerns and address them urgently.

With regards
Apar Gupta – Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF)
Sunita VS Bandewar- Forum for Medical Ethics Society (FMES) and Jan Swasthya Abhiyan
Sulakshana Nandi- Jan Swasthya Abhiyan
P.Rajamanickam- All India People’s Science Network (AIPSN)

This letter has been endorsed by the following organisations, networks and individuals:
Organisational endorsements
Janchetna Sansthan Abu Road
Lok Manch New Delhi
Rethink Aadhaar Campaign India
Right To Food Campaign India

Individual Endorsements
1 Aayushman Aggarwal Student
2 Abha Feminist activist
3 Adarsh Ranjan Student
4 Akshayarka Deka Big Data Analyst
5 Alka Pawangadkar Translator/Trainer
6 Amar Jesani Editor, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, Mumbai
7 Amitranjan Basu Doctor, Shaheed Hospital
8 Ammu Abraham Women’s rights and Civil liberties activist
9 Anand Nandakumar Lawyer
10 Anand Philip Independent Researcher, Bangalore
11 Anja Kovacs Director, Internet Democracy Project
12 Anurag Modi Social Activist, Shramik Adivasi Sanghatana, Madhya Pradesh
13 Apoorva Umap Student
14 Arindom Bora Student
15 Arundhati Dhuru Social activist, National convener NAPM
16 Arvind IT
17 Ashish Kothari Kalpavriksh, Pune
18 Assunta Pardhe Social worker and lawyer, Chief Functionary Chetna Mahila Vikas Kendra
19 Avi Student
20 Aysha Concerned citizen
21 Barathi Nakkeeran Independent Researcher
22 Barun Mukhopadhyay Professor (Retired), Indian Statistical Institute, Biological Anthropology Unit, Kolkata
23 Bindu Desai Retired Neurologist
24 Ch Narendra Senior Journalist, Hyderabad
25 Chayanika Shah Queer Feminist Researcher
26 Deepika Joshi Researcher, PUCL, Chhattisgarh
27 Deepriya Snehi Advocate
28 Devdutta Lawyer
29 Devika Shetty Independent mental health activist, Goa
30 Dharmesh shah Researcher
31 Divya Sornaraja Engineer
32 Dr.Ganesh Singh Dharmshaktu, Associate Professor, Department of Orthopaedics, Government Medical College,         Haldwani Uttarakhand
33 Dr Shakeel Physician. The Polyclinic
34 Dr Shriyuta A Infosys fellow in Public Health, SEARCH, Gadchiroli
35 Dr Sylvia Karpagam Public health doctor
36 Dr. Harish Gupta Consultant Physician , Internal Medicine, Lucknow
37 Dr. J. Charles Davis Professor of Bioethics and Moral Theology
38 Dr. Kamaxi Bhate Professor Emeritus KEM Hospital
39 Dr. Mahesh Devnani Doctor, Hospital Administrator
40 Dr. Mohan Rao Former professor at the Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health, JNU
41 Dr. Prashanth N S Institute of Public Health, Bengaluru.
42 Dr. Satendra Singh, Disability Rights activist & doctor at University College of Medical Sciences & GTB Hospital,         Delhi
43 Dr. V Visvanathan Computer Technologist
44 Dr.Mohan Rao Independent public health researcher
45 Dr.Tusharkanti Dey Retired Academician
46 Fatima A Castillo Researcher
47 Gargi Sharma Software Engineer
48 Geeta Seshu Journalist, Co-Editor, Free Speech Collective
49 Goldee kushwaha Student
50 Gurpreet Singh Digital Marketing Manager
51 Hari Prasad Tripathi Student
52 Hashim Khan Working, CGSACS – Deputy Director
53 Hrishikesh Bhaskaran Secretary, Swathanthanthra Malayalam Computing
54 Imtitangit Pongener Student
55 Indira C Public health researcher, Delhi
56 Jagannath Chatterjee Patient Advocate, Bhubaneswar
57 Jashodhara Dasgupta Independent researcher, New Delhi.
58 Jhuma Sen Associate Professor, JGLS
59 Joy Bhattacharjee Cloud Infrastructure Consultant
60 Jyotsna Tirkey Service, Jan Swasthya Abhiyan
61 K Ram Independent Educator
62 Kabi Activist
63 Kalyani Menon Sen Independent researcher
64 Kamayani Bali Mahabal Trainer Gender, Health and Human Rights, Jan Swasthya Abhiyan, Mumbai – Convenor
65 Kamlesh Khantwal State Coordinator BGVS and JSA Uttarakhand
66 Khrisha Shah Entrepreneur, Dysco (Co-Founder & CEO)
67 Kim Fernandes Delhi/University of Pennsylvania
68 Kiran Jonnalagadda Technologist
69 Leo Saldanha Researcher, Environment Support Group, Bangalore, India
70 Linda Chhakchhuak Concerned citizen
71 Madhuresh Kumar National Convener, NAPM
72 Mahathi Doctor
73 Mahesh Devnani Chandigarh
74 Maithreyi M R Consulting editor
75 Manavi Lawyer
76 Mansi Sood Advocate
77 Mary Mathai Scientist
78 Md Rushd Al Amin Student
79 Medha Kale Social activist and Translator, Trustee, Tathapi Trust Pune
80 Meena Gopal Researcher and activist, Forum against Oppresssion of Women
81 Mrinal Sharma Lawyer, Amnesty International India, Policy Advisor
82 Murali Advocate
83 Nagmani Rao Retired Academic, Citizen
84 Navneet Wadkar PhD Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
85 Neelanjana Public Health Researcher, Jan Swasthya Abhiyan, Chhattisgarh
86 Nikhat Hetavkar Law student
87 Nilanjana Dey Marketer
88 Niraj Bhatt Researcher, Citizen consumer and civic Action Group
89 Niranjan Sathyamurthy Illustrator
90 Oishik Sircar Academic
91 Padmini Ray Murray Independent Researcher, Founder, Design Beku
92 Paranjoy Guha Thakurta Journalist, author, publisher and documentary film-maker
93 Paulomi Chakraborty Associate Professor, Humanities and Social Sciences
94 Peehu Pardeshi Teacher, Jan Swasthya Abhiyan member
95 Piyali Mitra Researcher, Forum for Medical Ethics, Member
96 Prabha Doctor
97 Pradeep Esteves Context India, Bangalore
98 Pranav Mattapalli Student
99 Praveer Peter Social Worker, Convenor, Solidarity Centre, Ranchi
100 Preethika Lawyer
101 Prof Dr Fatima Castillo Manila, Philippines
102 Prof Dr Siby George IITB, Mumbai
103 Raghav Mendiratta Lawyer
104 Rajalakshmi Independent
105 Rajendra Gadwal Social Activist, Samajwadi Jan Parishad
106 Rajendran Narayanan Assistant Professor, Azim Premji University
107 Ravi Duggal Independent Researcher and Activist
108 Ricky Saldanha Research & Insights professional
109 Rishab Bailey Lawyer and technology policy researcher, New Delhi
110 Roopashri Sinha Freelance research consultant
111 Rujvi Lawyer
112 Sagari Ramdas Veterinary Scientist, Food Sovereignty Alliance, India Member
113 S Saroja Director – Consumer Protection, Citizen consumer and civic Action Group
114 Saloni Madan Student
115 Sandeep K Shukla Professor
116 Sandeep Pandey Social activist, Vice President Socialist Party (India)
117 Sandhya Srinivasan Journalist
118 Sangeeta CEHAT
119 Santosh Mahindrakar Nurse
120 Saurabh Bhattacharjee Academia
121 Senthamil Selvan K. Health activist
122 Shals Mahajan Writer, Member, LABIA – A Queer Feminist LBT Collective
123 Shamim Meghani Modi Teacher, FMES
124 Sharmila IIT Bombay
125 Shatakshi Student
126 Siddharth Chakravarty, Researcher
127 Srijit Mishra, Bhubaneswar
128 Srinivas kodali, Independent Researcher
129 Srinivasan G , Technology Professional, Sochara – Volunteer
130 Subhashis Banerjee, Professor, IIT Delhi
131 Sudha N, Researcher & Activist
132 Sudhir Pattnaik Senior Journalist, Bhubaneswar
133 Sujata Gothoskar Researcher and activist
134 Sujata Patel Teacher and Researcher
135 Sujata Sethi Rohtak
136 Sukla Sen Peace Activist
137 Sumi Krishna Independent researcher, Bengaluru
138 Sunep Imsong Tech Lead
139 Sunil Tamminaina Research Scholar
140 Supriya Subramani Postdoc
141 Surbhi Shrivastava PhD Student
142 Swatija Retired
143 Tanvi Sharma Advocate, Volunteers Collective
144 Tara Murli Architect , Chennai
145 Vivek Divan Centre for Health Equity, Law & Policy: Indian Law Society, Pune

Joint Statement on Technical, legal, ethical and implementation concerns regarding Aarogya Setu and other apps introduced during COVID-19 in India by JSA, IFF, FMES and AIPSN

Joint Statement on Technical, legal, ethical and implementation concerns regarding Aarogya Setu and other apps introduced during COVID-19 in India

by Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (JSA), Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF),Forum for Medical Ethics Society (FMES), and All India People’s Science Network (AIPSN)

 

Click here for pdf of Joint Statement on Aarogya Setu by IFF, JSA, AISPN, FMES

 

We, the four signatory networks of organizations of public health advocates, experts in digital privacy, science and technology policy advocates and other stakeholders issue this Statement for generating public understanding and for submission to the Government of India (GoI) and concerned Union Ministries – Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEIT), and Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoH&FW) – about our deep concerns regarding the Aarogya Setu (AS) and other similar Apps related to the novel Corona virus epidemic. We are deeply concerned about violation of privacy, and compromised ethical principles and values, due to the AS App‟s design, its deployment, related policies regarding data storage, preservation of privacy and data sharing, as well as overall policy implementation and inadequate legal frameworks for data protection and grievance redressal for users.

We appreciate the need of the hour viz.:
1. the unprecedented nature and massive impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in India 2. the need for a multi-pronged approach to contain the pandemic and minimize its adverse impact on all domains of our lives 3. therefore the need for innovative approaches, including digital technology-based ones, that may be required to augment and complement other containment and mitigation measures

Key challenge

Ensuring that a balance is struck between achieving greater public good and safeguarding individuals‟ rights and freedoms in alignment with frameworks provided by the Constitution of India, public health ethics discourse, International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR 2005), the Siracusa Principles on Civil and Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this context, we conducted a detailed analysis of the AS App purposed as a catch-all solution, its Privacy Policy, Terms of Services (henceforth ToS) and Aarogya Setu Data Access and Knowledge Sharing Protocol, 2020 (henceforth, Protocol), and its code available on GitHub taking into account the broader eco-system in which Aarogya Setu has been deployed and is being used. This is presented in the more detailed position paper available with us and which informs this statement articulating key issues across five domains viz., technical and platform design; legal and policy frames; transparency and public engagement; eco-system in India in which the App has been deployed; and ethics and human rights.

Key issues

I. Technical and platform design domain

At a technical level, the AS App does not conform to key technical best practices being developed internationally. The following major concerns arise:
1. The AS App collects people‟s GPS trails about which many democracies, technologists and the World Health Organisation (WHO) have had concerns. It uses centralised social graph analysis to map interactions between individuals, thereby contravening the strongly supported decentralised data storage systems which safeguards citizens‟ real-world activities. It also uses a static Device ID which is rudimentary, and is prone to risks of re-identification (i.e. the anonymised personal data may be matched with the actual person thereby exposing who the person is).

2. The AS App‟s centralised data storage system enables exporting of people‟s sensitive personal details to an external government-operated server which is linked with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) database and others. These are being provided to third parties such as research universities and private consultancy firms. Overall, this is an expansive approach to data collection and extraction, and clearly undermines privacy of people‟s data.

3. The AS App categorizes people as being at high risk of COVID-19 simply based on the App‟s opaque algorithm and inaccurate Bluetooth and GPS based proximity tracking. This creates a non-trivial risk of false positives and negatives, leading to other severe social, personal and public health consequences. The use of self-reported symptoms also runs the risk of people wrongly marking themselves as positive or negative.

II. Legal and policy domain
1. Aarogya Setu App‟s privacy policy or supporting documents such as its ToS and the Protocol, assert that data retention or deletion requirements do not apply to people‟s data which has been “anonymised” and can therefore be seamlessly shared with third parties.

This raises three key issues:

a. standards of “anonymization” are not defined in the ToS and the Protocol

b. standards if any are not shared with the user and no consent sought for using their “anonymized” data

c. there is no sunset clause for the personal data AS App collects. The, “sunset” is to the protocol rather than the underlying personal data. This evokes concerns of permanent surveillance

2. The data security and protection framework under the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011, are not applicable to government authorities, so there is no automatic or compulsory privacy protection

3. The voluntary Electronic Health Records Standards which provide certain privacy and security protocols for data disclosures during times of national priority, lacks suitable enforceability.

4. The latest draft of the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 introduced in India‟s Parliament in December 2019 is insufficient. It grants omnibus exemptions to Governments for emergency/ epidemic situations which is inconsistent with the contours of the right to privacy and reasonable restrictions during emergency situations as prescribed by the Supreme Court of India in its seminal right to privacy judgement in KS Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017).

5. Obligations under the IHR 2005 to which India is legally bound, require governments to ensure that national legislative frameworks relating to data sharing are adopted and be consistent with international human rights frameworks and foundational ethical principles. Lack of such legal framework in India implies lack of protection from potential commercial surveillance.

6. From a policy perspective, there is no independent institutional oversight on (a) public agencies and the businesses developing these Apps; (b) ethical and human rights aspects; and (c) the App‟s actual deployment.

III. Transparency and public engagement domain
1. As per information in the public domain, Government of India (GoI), had initiated building of the AS App on March 19, 2020, and it was launched on April 2, 2020. As per standard best practice, GoI should have issued a technical whitepaper and consulted the public and external stakeholders before launching the App. However, even now, more than four months since the AS App‟s launch, GoI has not published any such document.

2. The lack of a structured public debate and public engagement around the AS App raises questions about its quality, and about the adequacy of ethical, procedural or institutional safeguards to mitigate risks arising from such technological interventions.

3. The National Informatics Center (NIC) has informed the media that it opted for a public-private partnership model to develop the AS App. For example, For example, UX Design at MakeMyTrip has been a private volunteer in building these systems. This evokes concerns of commercial exploitation and risk to privacy of the data collected through the AS App.

4. The underlying source code of the AS App was also not released for the longest time which is, again, best practice in such cases. Eventually, the GoI released the source code but it has not yet released the server-side code or the cloud functions. Experts have observed that the source code released on GitHub is inconsistent with the App which is being used by the public. This has therefore only marginal value in terms of transparency and is inconsistent with globally accepted standards of open source software.

5. There is ambiguity in the key AS App documents namely ToS, Protocol, and Privacy Policy. These include inadequate information for AS App users about the type and purpose of data collected, where and for how long data will be stored, with whom these data will be shared and for what purposes. A NITI Aayog official has indicated that data collected via the AS App is feeding into the development of India/Bharat Health Stack and that raises various other concerns but will not be dealt with here. 6. There is inadequate transparency about the various data points and inputs the App‟s algorithm relies upon to arrive at its risk scoring of users as green, yellow, orange or red.

IV. India’s eco-system in which AS App is deployed

1. Indian governance systems habitually work in silos and inter-departmental coordination is extremely weak. Potential usefulness of the deployment of AS App depends upon how well the App data and its processing system is linked to contact tracing, testing and treatment through a well-equipped and trained health system. Unfortunately, there has been surprisingly little information put out so far by concerned government agencies as to how such institutional linkages have worked and how the App data has been used.

2. innovations in collection and processing of citizens‟ data must comply with broader legal and ethical frameworks and constitutional rights of citizens which have historically been weak and have come under increasing threat in recent times.

3. the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs is steering this effort instead of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, conveys that instead of linkage with testing and treatment, the AS App is more likely being purposed as a tool for surveillance and movement control, potentially leading to social coercion.

V. Constitutional and human rights, and public health ethics

1. The Medical Council of India‟s Code of Ethics does not cover protocols for health data in circumstances when it is shared with the Government

2. The Government‟s push to make the App effectively mandatory erodes individual autonomy as guaranteed by the Constitution

3. Critically, effectively mandatory use of the AS App is inconsistent with a recent WHO guidance on ethical considerations in the use of digital proximity tracing technologies.

4. The AS App’s Protocol is insufficient since it does not offer any legislative foundation for the AS App. Fundamental rights under the Constitution cannot be restricted by the Government even for legitimate purposes without express legislative authorisation.

5. Further, the Protocol fails to be consistent with standards of necessity and proportionality called for by both IHR 2005 and the Siracusa Principles. Specifically, it does not incorporate substantive language which sufficiently reigns in the government‟s ability to collect, store, process, retain and process people‟s sensitive personal details.

Our Demands: Against this backdrop, our Organizations demand as follows:

I. For proportionality: Three points of emphasis must be design and architecture of the AS app; transparency and effective public engagement; and limits to retention time and use of the data.

1. There is a constitutional obligation to adopt the least restrictive/intrusive measure to achieve the stated purpose. These thresholds can be benchmarked against known technological best practices and models, and the kinds of interventions adopted by other constitutional democracies. The design of interventions must also ensure that they do not disproportionately impact people from certain backgrounds, identities, and regions.

2. A full release of specifications including cryptography, anonymization specifications, Application Programming Interface (API) specifications, and Bluetooth specifications.

3. Release of the source code for the current version of the AS App, given the fact that the released code does not match with the one in use, and release of the server-side code.

4. Development of a comprehensive privacy impact assessment, articulating accompanying risks associated with large scale roll-out of the App.

5. Commitment (i.e. sunset clauses that are clearly present in primary legislation) to permanently destroy the data and systems being built via AS App at the end of the COVID-19 pandemic.

6. The AS App must not in any way be made mandatory by government or private actors;

7. Among other things, the focus must be on assuring the public that these are temporary interventions which will not devolve into permanent surveillance and monitoring systems.

II. For legality

1. Suitable legislation is required aim to hold the Union and State governments and private actors accountable for leakage or any inappropriate use of App data during epidemics and communicable disease outbreaks.

2. Under this, governments may only access patient data through hospital records, and must preserve patient anonymity.

3. These frameworks should be solely under the control of public health institutions.

III. For necessity: The government must establish:

1. The contextual necessity of the new technological interventions like the AS App which monitors people‟s movements since this is already being done by other actors (like telecom service providers).;

2. Grounds for treating the existing government databases, such as those maintained by ICMR and other existing surveillance mechanisms and hospital records as inadequate for the current purposes of responding to the pandemic

3. The expected advantage of interventions for collection of health and related information is collected, the actual technical effectiveness of the interventions itself, and a detailed cost-benefit/privacy impact analysis to evaluate risks before rolling out such Apps

4. Necessity as a dynamic construct, and that it is embedded through the life cycle of the AS programme. Within it there is a need for continual review of the programme as regards principles of transparency and accountability.

IV. Oversight Structures and Processes

1. The required legislation must create independent institutions for oversight separated from the political executive.

2. Towards this end, the agencies/institutions concerned should publish periodic reports informing the public if, and to what extent, the App is augmenting the Government’s response in treating and containing the spread of Covid-19. Based on such feedback loops, these institutions should be empowered to make decisions for course correction or even discontinuation of the programme itself, and the permanent destruction of the systems created.